What is it Like to be a Bat? - the hard problem of consciousness
Jeffrey Kaplan・25 minutes read
Thomas Nagel's critique of physicalism challenges theories that reduce mental phenomena to physical components, emphasizing consciousness as the subjective experience of being. Nagel argues that the subjective nature of consciousness makes it impossible to fully comprehend other beings' experiences, refuting physicalist and dualist explanations of consciousness.
Insights
- Thomas Nagel's critique of physicalism focuses on the subjective nature of consciousness, emphasizing the idea that understanding another being's conscious experience is inherently limited and unique to that being.
- Nagel argues that both physicalist and dualist theories fall short in explaining consciousness objectively, highlighting the fundamental challenge of capturing the subjective essence of consciousness through objective frameworks like science or reductionism.
Get key ideas from YouTube videos. It’s free
Recent questions
What is Thomas Nagel's critique in "What is it like to be a bat"?
Nagel critiques physicalism and explores consciousness.
How does Nagel define consciousness in his paper?
Consciousness is the subjective experience of existence.
What sensory ability do bats possess that humans lack?
Bats echolocate using sound waves.
Why does Nagel argue that humans cannot understand a bat's conscious experience?
Humans lack the ability to truly simulate a bat's perspective.
How does Nagel view the relationship between consciousness and subjective perspective?
Conscious facts can only be understood subjectively.
Related videos
Theory & Philosophy
Thomas Nagel's "What Is It Like To Be a Bat?"
YaleCourses
2. Foundations: This Is Your Brain
metaRising
Is Consciousness Primary to Reality? (Documentary)
Tim Ferriss
Does Consciousness Survive Death? | Prof. Donald Hoffman | The Tim Ferriss Show
Talks at Google
The Meta-Problem of Consciousness | Professor David Chalmers | Talks at Google
Summary
00:00
Nagel's Challenge to Physicalism: Consciousness and Bats
- Thomas Nagel's 1974 paper, "What is it like to be a bat," is a renowned critique of physicalism, a theory positing that everything in the universe is physical.
- Physicalism reduces mental phenomena to physical components, contrasting with dualism, which separates physical and mental entities.
- Nagel's attack on physicalism challenges various versions of the theory, including behaviorism, mind-brain identity theory, and functionalism.
- The central concept in Nagel's argument is consciousness, defined as the subjective experience or "what it's like" to be a particular being at a given time.
- Consciousness encompasses various mental states, with some being conscious, like experiencing hunger, while others, such as beliefs, can be unconscious.
- Nagel's definition of consciousness emphasizes the subjective experience or "what it is like" for an organism to exist.
- Bats echolocate using sound waves to navigate their environment, a sensory ability humans lack, prompting Nagel to question if we can truly understand a bat's conscious experience.
- Nagel argues that humans cannot comprehend the conscious experience of echolocation, likening it to the impossibility of truly understanding a bat's perspective.
- Nagel refutes the notion that humans can imagine or simulate a bat's experience accurately, emphasizing the unique and incomprehensible nature of a bat's consciousness.
- Nagel concludes that facts about the subjective experiences of different beings embody specific points of view, challenging the idea of fully grasping the consciousness of other creatures.
16:40
Subjective Nature of Consciousness Defies Objective Explanation
- Conscious facts can only be understood by adopting a particular subjective perspective.
- Nagel argues that physicalist theories fail to explain conscious facts due to their objective nature.
- Science aims to reveal objective truths, moving away from subjective viewpoints.
- Consciousness, unlike physical phenomena, is inherently subjective and cannot be objectively described.
- Nagel asserts that no scientific understanding of consciousness is possible due to its subjective nature.
- Reductionist physical language cannot capture the subjective experience of consciousness.
- Nagel concludes that physicalism is inadequate in explaining consciousness.
- Dualism, proposing non-physical elements like ectoplasm, also fails to explain consciousness objectively.
